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I.  Introduction 
COVID-19 demonstrates that a naturally occurring, 
communicable disease can threaten U.S. national security with 
deadly consequences. Upwards of 227,000 lives were lost in the 
United States due to COVID-19 between March and October 
2020. Another 8.8 million people in the United States contracted 
the disease during the same time span. Those numbers continue 
to grow.1 At the start of the pandemic, hospitals ran out of 
personal protective equipment for health care workers and 
life-saving ventilators for patients. The USS Theodore Roosevelt 
was almost entirely evacuated because sailors contracted the 
disease. Supply chains from toilet paper to pork were disrupted. 
For months, the nation’s attention and resources were 
consumed by the disease. The U.S. president was hospitalized 
for three days due to COVID-19. And the country’s 
highest-ranking military officers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were 
quarantined for two weeks in October after being exposed. 
COVID-19 revealed weaknesses in U.S. national security 
strategy, and the executive branch’s response compounded the 
risks.  
A national security strategy is the “nation’s plan for the 
coordinated use of all the instruments of state 
power — nonmilitary as well as military—to pursue objectives 
that defend and advance its national interest.”2 Perhaps the 
most straightforward national security objective is to protect the 
country from foreign invasion, but national security involves 
other objectives that aim to protect people in the United States 
as well as their values. For example, protecting U.S. elections 
from foreign interference is a security objective that advances 
the nation’s interest in democratic governance. The outbreak of 
a highly contagious disease like COVID-19 strikes at the core of 
national security and the nation’s interest in protecting its 
citizens from unnecessary harm.  
National security experts have warned that infectious 
diseases could result in human suffering, economic losses, and 
 
 1. Covid in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES, https://
perma.cc/J9RU-HTCX (last updated Nov. 23, 2020, 12:46 PM). 
 2. Terry L. Deibel, Strategy, National Security, in 5 INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY AND DEFENSE ENCYCLOPEDIA 2577, 2577–78 (Trevor N. Dupuy et al. 
eds., 1993). 
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political instability.3 They have explained that a pandemic or 
large-scale bioterrorist attack could cause mass casualties, 
overwhelm the health care system, quickly deplete medical 
supplies needed for treatment and to protect health care 
workers,4 drain the workforce, and interrupt supply chains,5 
leaving the United States susceptible to other security risks 
while resources are focused on mitigating the biological threat. 
COVID-19 affirmed their warnings. 
This article begins with an overview of U.S. national 
security strategy: what it is and why it is necessary. Part II 
describes the National Security Strategy of the United States 
and the National Biodefense Strategy: what they do and how 
they should work together. In Part III, the article compares and 
contrasts two presidents’ development and execution of 
strategies in response to national security crises: how President 
John F. Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and 
President Donald J. Trump’s response to the COVID-19 
pandemic differed. Part IV explores the COVID-19 pandemic’s 
immediate and long-term effects on U.S. national security. And 
Part V suggests ways to ensure policy makers are prepared to 
combat biological threats in the future.  
II.  Understanding National Security Strategy 
 Defense and national security strategy have existed 
throughout history, but rapid scientific and technological 
development during the twentieth century fundamentally 
 
 3. See HEALTH & MED. DIV., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G & MED., GLOBAL 
HEALTH AND THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 59 (2017), https://
perma.cc/T8U4-8V4V (PDF) (“Infectious disease outbreaks clearly impose 
terrible costs in terms of human suffering and mortality, as well as economic 
costs that threaten progress and stability in countries around the world, and 
that greatly exceed the costs of prevention and preparedness measures . . . .” 
(citations omitted)). See also Milley: COVID-19 Will Have Lasting Impact on 
Military, ASS’N U.S. ARMY (Apr. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/5U96-YM8K 
[hereinafter ASS’N U.S. ARMY], for a U.S. military leader’s description of how 
COVID-19 could affect economic and political stability. 
 4. See Roger Roffey et al., Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness: Importance of Public-Health Awareness and International 
Cooperation, 8 CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY & INFECTION 522, 525 (2002), https://
perma.cc/4HGV-XQLJ (PDF) (noting the effect on the health care system of a 
bioweapon outbreak).  
 5. HEALTH & MED. DIV., supra note 3, at 53–55.  
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shifted security dynamics. In the past, national security 
strategy primarily focused on military threats abroad. Today, it 
broadly encompasses domestic and international threats, 
whether of a military or nonmilitary nature, including the 
threats posed by a naturally occurring communicable disease. 
Despite these advances, the core question for national security 
strategy now is fundamentally the same as it was centuries ago: 
how does a nation best utilize its resources to achieve desired 
security objectives?6 
When the United States emerged from World War II as the 
global power, its military, intelligence, and foreign affairs 
capabilities were spread across numerous executive branch 
agencies. President Harry S. Truman and Congress recognized 
the need for a coordinated national security apparatus to ensure 
the United States could effectively respond to threats at home 
and around the world. After more than a year of negotiation 
with the Truman administration and military leaders, Congress 
passed the National Security Act of 19477 to centralize the 
federal government’s national security divisions and ensure the 
United States would have comprehensive, integrated policies for 
the protection of its people.8 Through the National Security Act, 
Congress reorganized the executive branch’s military, 
intelligence, and foreign affairs operations; created the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA); and established the National 
Security Council. Over time, Congress has amended the 
National Security Act to reflect evolving threats and compel 
presidents to annually submit to Congress a comprehensive set 
of goals, objectives, and tactics for securing the country’s 
interests at home and abroad.9  
 
 6. See DENNIS M. DREW & DONALD M. SNOW, MAKING 
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY STRATEGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN NATIONAL 
SECURITY PROCESSES & PROBLEMS 3–4 (2006), https://perma.cc/4Z4Z-SHSL 
(PDF) (describing the fundamentals of national security strategy in the 
modern military context). 
 7. Ch. 343, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C. §§ 3001–3238). 
 8. See Charles A. Stevenson, The Story Behind the National Security Act 
of 1947, MIL. REV., May–June 2008, at 13, 13 (overviewing negotiations 
relating to the National Security Act). 
 9. See, e.g., Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 10 U.S.C.). 
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 The National Security Act did not spring forth fully 
formed from the head of a god, like Athena. It was born out of 
the United States’ new role as world leader during an era 
defined by rapid scientific and technological change. That law 
and its progeny recognize that national security strategy is no 
longer synonymous with military strategy and foreign affairs. 
Threats are increasingly technological, complex, or diffuse, 
which magnifies the roles of data collection, subject matter 
expertise, and information sharing. The federal government 
needs the best-available data—including, in some instances, 
covert intelligence—in order to analyze and respond to potential 
threats. People with subject matter expertise must analyze the 
data to assess potential threats. And government officials must 
work together to develop a comprehensive national security 
strategy that lays out how the nation can efficiently utilize its 
resources to achieve desired outcomes in light of data and threat 
assessments.  
As new threats emerged during and after World War II, the 
evolution of the United States’ national security strategy, 
formalized under the National Security Act, explains how a 
naturally occurring novel virus like COVID-19 fits under the 
expanding umbrella of security strategy. Technological 
advancements emerging from the Industrial Revolution allowed 
countries to develop long-range weapons such as military 
aircraft, the atomic bomb, ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial 
vehicles, and other innovations that shattered the illusion of 
invulnerability of the United States’ domestic facilities, which 
had been sheltered from conflict by two oceans.10 Scientific 
progression in the field of microbiology led countries to explore 
the weaponization of biological agents—bacteria, viruses, and 
fungi in particular—and to develop countermeasures for a 
biological attack.11 And environmental degradation, easy travel 
among countries, and climate change increase the likelihood 
that naturally occurring pathogens will quickly spread around 
the world, making countries more susceptible to other security 
 
 10. DREW & SNOW, supra note 6, at 6–10; Roger Roffey et al., Biological 
Warfare in a Historical Perspective, 8 CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY & INFECTION 
450, 450 (2002), https://perma.cc/VJ94-3ZTP (PDF). 
 11. Roffey et al., supra note 4, at 523; Friedrich Frischknecht, The History 
of Biological Warfare, 4 EMBO REP. S47, S48 (2003), https://perma.cc/A9GU-
UGTM (PDF). 
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threats as they focus resources on combatting disease 
outbreaks.12 
III.  Developing the National Security Strategy of the United 
States and National Biodefense Strategy 
In 1986, Congress modified the National Security Act to 
require that the U.S. president issue a yearly report laying out 
the national security strategy of the United States.13 Although 
no president since Ronald Reagan has issued a yearly report, 
each president has produced at least one National Security 
Strategy of the United States (NSS) during each term in office.14 
NSS reports reflect national and global realities, but they 
historically center on occurrences in nation-states. For example, 
the 1991 NSS came on the heels of the Gulf War, collapse of the 
Soviet Union, and a U.S. economic recession, so it focused on 
diplomatic cooperation among countries, democracy building in 
former Soviet states, and economic security at home.15 Then, 
following the 9/11 attacks, the United States shifted its focus 
from nation-states to non-state actors.  
 The 1990 NSS and successive reports had mentioned the 
national security threat posed by foreign nations’ possession of 
biological weapons, but the threat posed by disease outside the 
military context was unmentioned until 1993. NSS reports from 
1993 to 1997 treated disease predominantly as a threat to 
economic health. The 1999 NSS was the first to explain that an 
overseas outbreak of a naturally occurring disease could have 
“important implications for American security.”16 Then, in 2001, 
 
 12. See Jim Robbins, The Ecology of Disease, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2012), 
https://perma.cc/C62A-FGPD (explaining the relationship between the 
environment and disease); JOSHUA W. BUSBY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND NATIONAL 
SECURITY 5–6 (2007), https://perma.cc/W5TY-4AAP (PDF) (describing the 
effects of climate change on national security). 
 13. 50 U.S.C. § 3043. 
 14. CATHERINE DALE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43174, NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY: MANDATES, EXECUTION TO DATE, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3 (2013), 
https://perma.cc/XE5T-U9Z7 (PDF). 
 15. See generally WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1991), https://perma.cc/BY63-LNF5 (PDF).  
 16. See WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW 
CENTURY 1 (1999), https://perma.cc/URV5-M85D (PDF) (“Other problems 
 
BIOLOGICAL THREATS  223 
 
a series of anthrax attacks targeted national media and 
Congress, reshaping the threat dynamic to reflect the domestic 
threat posed by biological agents. During the month following 
the 9/11 terror attacks, an individual mailed letters containing 
anthrax to news outlets and two U.S. senators. The anthrax 
attacks killed five people and infected twenty-two others, 
sparking changes to federal law and prompting the George W. 
Bush administration to issue a directive laying out a national 
security strategy for future biothreats.17 President Barack 
Obama’s administration expanded and built upon the Bush 
directive, emphasizing the need to protect global health security 
and track the emergence of communicable disease, whether 
naturally occurring or bioengineered.18 
In 2015, a panel of national security experts convened the 
Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense, which found that “[t]he 
United States is underprepared for biological threats. Nation 
states and unaffiliated terrorists (via biological terrorism) and 
nature itself (via emerging and reemerging infectious diseases) 
threaten us.”19 The Blue Ribbon Study Panel found that the 
United States had no comprehensive national strategy for 
responding to biological threats, and responsibility was spread 
across more than a dozen federal agencies or departments, with 
more than four dozen federal officials in charge of 
biopreparedness.20 The Blue Ribbon Study Panel’s findings 
 
originating overseas—such as resource depletion, rapid population growth, 
environmental damage, new infectious diseases, pervasive corruption, and 
uncontrolled refugee migration—have increasingly important implications for 
American security.” (emphasis added)). 
 17. Rachel Long, Bioterrorism in the 21st Century, GLOB. AFFS. REV. (Apr. 
11, 2018), https://perma.cc/A6KG-3HMR. 
 18. Gregory D. Koblentz, From Biodefense to Biosecurity: The Obama 
Administration’s Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, 88 INT’L AFF. 131, 
131–33 (2012), https://perma.cc/U3FN-3XFV (PDF). 
 19. Joseph I. Lieberman & Thomas J. Ridge, Preface to BLUE RIBBON 
STUDY PANEL ON BIODEFENSE, BIPARTISAN COMM’N ON BIODEFENSE, A NATIONAL 
BLUEPRINT FOR BIODEFENSE: LEADERSHIP AND MAJOR REFORM NEEDED TO 
OPTIMIZE EFFORTS, at iv (2015), https://perma.cc/6LSB-6HST (PDF).  
 20. Id.; Rachel Bartholomew & Kristin Omberg, Making Sense of the 2018 
National Biodefense Strategy, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Jan. 18, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/F6A7-X8FM (“[T]he 2015 bipartisan report of the Blue 
Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense warned that despite ‘a decade of profusion 
of policy directives,’ the United States had failed to produce a comprehensive 
biodefense strategy spanning prevention to recovery.” (emphasis added)).  
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spurred Congress to include a provision in the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 requiring the secretaries 
of Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, 
and Agriculture to develop a comprehensive national biodefense 
strategy.21 
 The Trump administration issued both an updated NSS 
and a National Biodefense Strategy (NBS). The NSS explicitly 
addresses natural disease outbreaks such as COVID-19:  
Biological threats to the U.S. homeland—whether as the 
result of deliberate attack, accident, or a natural outbreak—
are growing and require actions to address them at their 
source . . . . At home, we will strengthen our emergency 
response and unified coordination systems to rapidly 
characterize outbreaks, implement public health 
containment measures to limit the spread of disease, and 
provide surge medical care—including life-saving 
treatments.22   
The NBS extends beyond a purely governmental approach 
to protecting against a biological threat. It lays out a plan for 
the federal government to work alongside state, local, tribal, 
medical, and industry leaders to prevent and mitigate biological 
risks.23 It makes key assumptions about biological threats, 
whether naturally occurring, including that “[b]iological 
[t]hreats are [p]ersistent,” “[o]riginate from [m]ultiple 
[s]ources,” and “[d]o [n]ot [r]espect [b]orders.”24 Among other 
prescriptions for responding to biological threats, the NBS calls 
for the federal government to “[d]evelop, exercise, and update 
prevention, response, and recovery plans and capabilities”; 
“[e]stablish capability to provide surge staffing, resources, and 
supplies” to state, local, and tribal governments’ public health 
departments; coordinate with all levels of government to 
develop clinical guidance for triage and management of disease 
outbreaks; conduct pre-incident planning for the distribution of 
federal medical countermeasures stockpiles, including personal 
 
 21. Id.; National Defense Reauthorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. 
L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2000. 
 22. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 9 (2017), https://perma.cc/2VZ2-3ZK4 (PDF).  
 23. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, at i (2018), https://
perma.cc/47X2-GFJD (PDF).  
 24. Id. at 3–4. 
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protective equipment; and “provide clear, consistent, and 
coordinated information” to the public.25 
IV.  Executing the Strategy 
 National security strategies can be effective only if 
decision makers have clear objectives and are capable of 
listening to diverse perspectives, digesting information, revising 
courses of action based on new data, and following through with 
the strategic plan. In contrast, a decision maker who distrusts 
experts, rejects intelligence, acts according to gut instincts, and 
rejects strategy can endanger national security. President John 
F. Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 is a 
case study in effective national security leadership. President 
Donald J. Trump’s response to COVID-19 illustrates how a 
capricious and disinterested decision maker can derail 
evidence-based strategy and endanger national security. 
A.  The Cuban Missile Crisis 
Throughout 1962, the Soviet Union had increased its 
military presence in Cuba, leading President John F. Kennedy 
to issue a statement on September 4, laying out the United 
States’ national security objective vis-à-vis Cuba’s growing 
military relationship with the Soviet Union: “It continues to be 
the policy of the [U.S.] that the Castro regime will not be allowed 
to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force. It 
will be prevented by whatever means may be necessary from taking 
action against any part of the Western Hemisphere.”26 To put it 
succinctly, it was the policy of the United States that Cuba not 
acquire offensive or nuclear weapons capabilities. A month later, 
however, the world was on the brink of nuclear war, and the 
post-World War II national security reorganization passed by 
Congress would be put to the test. 
On October 14, 1962, a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance flight 
captured photographs of what appeared to be Soviet nuclear 
 
 25. Id. at 16–18. 
 26. John F. Kennedy, President, U.S. Reaffirms Policy on Prevention of 
Aggressive Actions by Cuba, Statement Read to News Correspondents by 
Pierre Salinger, the White House Press Secretary (Sept. 4, 1962), in DEP’T ST. 
BULL., Sept. 1962, at 450. 
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missile installations in Cuba, which would mean Cuba had 
access to offensive weapons in violation of Kennedy’s policy to 
keep such weapons out of the Castro regime’s hands. Before 
sounding the alarm, military intelligence verified the images, 
then consulted with the CIA to ensure the data and analysis 
from the photographs were accurate. After verifying what the 
photographs showed, the CIA shared the information with 
National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy. Bundy then 
presented the data and expert analysis to Kennedy.27 The 
centralized and coordinated national security apparatus 
envisioned by Congress in the National Security Act of 1947 had 
worked. The military and CIA had worked together to gather 
and analyze data, then passed it along to the White House 
through the National Security Advisor. It was up to Kennedy to 
develop and execute a strategy that would achieve the United 
States’ objective to keep offensive weapons out of Cuba. 
Upon receiving a briefing from Bundy, Kennedy 
immediately assembled a group of advisers with expertise in 
national security, foreign affairs, and domestic affairs to assess 
the United States’ resources and craft strategies to remove the 
missiles from Cuba. That group, known as ExComm (short for 
Executive Committee of the National Security Council), was 
comprised of cabinet members, military brass, diplomats, and 
intelligence officials, as well as trusted advisers who understood 
the potential political fallout in the United States. ExComm was 
tasked with reviewing data, including ongoing surveillance, and 
developing options for dealing with the missile threat. During 
ExComm meetings, Kennedy took charge. He engaged with 
maps, intelligence, and military tactics; challenged his advisers’ 
ideas and pushed them to think through geopolitical 
repercussions of potential U.S. actions; and never stopped 
asking questions.28  
ExComm presented Kennedy with three main responses to 
remove the missiles from Cuba: Military action, diplomacy, or a 
blockade. Military action included air strikes against the missile 
 
 27. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962: A NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE 
DOCUMENTS READER 358–59 (Laurence Chang & Peter Kornbluh eds., 1992). 
 28. See McGeorge Bundy & James G. Blight, October 27, 1962: 
Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm, 12 INT’L SEC. 30 (1987), https://
perma.cc/XUD6-Q85Y (PDF) (transcribing and annotating presidential 
recordings of ExComm meetings). 
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sites, wider air strikes against the missile sites and military 
targets, invasion, or some combination thereof. Diplomatic 
efforts centered on offering to remove U.S. nuclear missiles from 
Turkey in exchange for the removal of Soviet nuclear missiles in 
Cuba. And a blockade would involve either preventing arms 
from reaching Cuba or cutting off all supplies from reaching the 
island.29 On October 24, before settling on a course of action, 
Kennedy consulted with congressional leaders representing 
both parties in the House and Senate to get their input on 
responding to the crisis. Like many ExComm members 
including all Joint Chiefs of Staff, congressional leaders favored 
strong military intervention and thought a blockade would be 
the weakest response.30 
Throughout the crisis, Kennedy was reticent about military 
intervention, and a blockade under international law would 
presume the existence of armed conflict. After days of 
deliberating with experts and consulting with Congress, 
Kennedy settled on a strategic plan to get the missiles out of 
Cuba. He would publicly announce a blockade (euphemistically 
referred to as a “quarantine” to avoid the international law 
implications) to prevent Soviet weapons from entering Cuba and 
privately enter into a diplomatic deal to remove U.S. Jupiter 
missiles from Turkey in exchange for the removal of Soviet 
missiles from Cuba. Congress and the public would know about 
the quarantine, but the diplomatic exchange would remain 
secret to all but a few individuals inside the Kennedy 
administration. Kennedy followed through with his 
two-pronged plan, despite pressure from military leaders and 
high-ranking members of Congress to pursue a more aggressive 
strategy. His strategy worked. The Soviet Union withdrew its 
missiles from Cuba, the United States later withdrew its 
missiles from Turkey, and the immediate threat of nuclear war 
dissipated. 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. 2 THE PRESIDENTIAL RECORDINGS: JOHN F. KENNEDY 52–81 (Timothy 
Naftali & Philip Zelikow eds., 2001).  
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B.  The COVID-19 Pandemic 
President Donald J. Trump’s response to COVID-19, the 
global pandemic that shut down much of the United States for 
most of 2020, demonstrates how national security threats can 
cripple the country if left unmitigated. On December 31, 2019, 
Wuhan Municipal Health Center in China reported a cluster 
outbreak of pneumonia with an unknown cause. During the first 
week of January 2020, the cause was identified as a novel 
coronavirus, which was labeled SARS-CoV-2. Shortly after 
SARS-CoV-2 was identified, the disease it caused, referred to as 
COVID-19, spread to Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Europe, 
and the United States. On January 20, the first identified case 
of COVID-19 appeared in the United States, and on January 30, 
the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
reported the first case of human-to-human transmission of 
COVID-19 in the country.31 
The Trump administration was not without a plan for 
dealing with a national-security threat in the form of a 
contagious disease. It was without leadership. Despite his own 
administration having released a National Biodefense Strategy, 
Trump’s plan for COVID-19 was to “Just stay calm. It will go 
away.”32 The NBS called for the federal government to develop, 
practice, and revise a biothreat response plan, but a year and a 
half before COVID-19 began spreading around the world, the 
Trump administration dismantled the National Security 
Council’s pandemic response team.33 Trump would not appoint 
a centralized COVID-19 response team until the disease had 
infected at least sixty people in the United States. And unlike 
Kennedy, who took an active leadership role in ExComm 
 
 31. A Timeline of COVID-19 Developments in 2020, AM. J. MANAGED CARE 
(July 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/7EFW-L9TK. 
 32. President Donald J. Trump, Remarks by President Trump After 
Meeting with Republican Senators, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 10, 2020, 1:57 PM), 
https://perma.cc/2LFU-ZELB. 
 33. Deb Reichmann, Trump Disbanded NSC Pandemic Unit That 
Experts Had Praised, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 14, 2020), https://
perma.cc/QX79-UHHX. 
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meetings, Trump only sporadically attended meetings of the 
response team.34  
The NBS called for the federal government to plan in 
advance for the distribution of federal medical countermeasures 
stockpiles, including personal protective equipment, and to 
provide resources and supplies to state, local, and tribal 
governments, but the Strategic National Stockpile ran out of 
N-95 respirators and other medical equipment direly needed by 
health care providers during the COVID-19 pandemic. A senior 
advisor to Trump contradicted the NBS and said that the 
stockpile was “not supposed to be states’ stockpiles that they 
then use,” then the Trump administration revised the Strategic 
National Stockpile’s website to downplay the federal 
government’s role regarding the provision of resources and 
supplies to states during a disease outbreak.35 And the NBS 
emphasized the need for clear, consistent, and coordinated 
information from the federal government during a biological 
event, a strategy President Trump ignored as he openly 
contradicted his own experts’ assessments and publicly floated 
unscientific (and sometimes life-threatening) ideas for treating 
COVID-19.36 
Throughout his tenure in office, Trump had attacked the 
intelligence community, going as far as describing his own 
intelligence officials as “passive and naive” and telling them to 
“go back to school” while they testified in Congress about threats 
emanating from Iran.37 Trump’s distrust of the intelligence 
community helps explain, in part, his slow response to 
COVID-19. Whereas Kennedy relied heavily on data and 
 
 34. Ashley Parker, Yasmeen Abutaleb & Josh Dawsey, Trump 
Administration Has Many Task Forces—But Still No Plan for Beating 
COVID-19, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2020, 8:45 PM), https://perma.cc/9EQP-
K47G. 
 35. Adam Clark Estes, America’s Emergency Medical Stockpile is Almost 
Empty. Nobody Knows What Happens Next., VOX, https://perma.cc/DXH9-
KTCR (last updated Apr. 7, 2020, 11:20 AM). 
 36. See Libby Cathey, Trump Versus the Doctors: When the President and 
His Experts Contradict Each Other, ABC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2020, 6:55PM), 
https://perma.cc/S6VW-W2H3. 
 37. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), TWITTER (Jan. 30, 2019, 7:50 
AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1090608298343190528; 
Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), TWITTER (Jan. 30, 2019, 7:56 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1090609577006112769. 
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intelligence to inform his plans to mitigate the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, Trump ignored warnings from intelligence officials, 
epidemiologists, and global health experts about COVID-19. By 
mid-January 2020, U.S. national security intelligence was clear 
that COVID-19 was a pandemic risk that could reach the United 
States. According to Washington Post reporting, COVID-19 
comprised a majority of the intelligence data in the President’s 
Daily Brief,38 which is a daily summary of the most pressing 
high-level intelligence produced for and presented to the 
president. Intelligence reports presented to the president 
became an “insistent drumbeat” warning about the danger of 
COVID-19 in the United States, according to administration 
officials.39 In a February 7 phone call with journalist Bob 
Woodward, Trump privately said that COVID-19 “goes through 
air. . . . You just breathe the air and that’s how it’s 
passed. . . . It’s also more deadly than your strenuous 
flus. . . . This is deadly stuff.”40 In public, Trump downplayed 
the risk. On February 19, he proclaimed, “I think it’s going to 
work out fine. I think when we get into April, in the warmer 
weather, that has a very negative effect on [COVID-19].”41 
Without evidence, he told the country, “the Coronavirus is very 
much under control in the USA.”42 On February 26, he stated, 
again without evidence, that “within a couple of days[, 
COVID-19] is going to be down to close to zero.”43 During a Fox 
News interview on March 4, Trump called COVID-19 the 
 
 38. Greg Miller & Ellen Nakashima, President’s Intelligence Briefing 
Book Repeatedly Cited Virus Threat, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2020, 4:22 PM), 
https://perma.cc/3WRU-HJMA.  
 39. Id. 
 40. Robert Costa & Philip Rucker, Woodward Book: Trump Says He Knew 
Coronavirus was ‘Deadly’ and Worse Than the Flu While Intentionally 
Misleading Americans, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2020, 10:55 AM), https://perma.cc
/QGD2-YBL6 (interview with President Donald J. Trump available in audio 
player captioned, “Listen: In a Feb. 7 interview, when asked what Chinese 
President Xi Jinping told him about the virus, Trump says, ‘This is deadly 
stuff.’”). 
 41. Interview by Kari Lake, Fox 10 Phoenix, with President Donald J. 
Trump (Feb. 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/XU4Y-TFBK. 
 42. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), TWITTER (Feb. 24, 2020, 3:42 
PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1232058127740174339. 
 43. Jonathan Chait, Trump: I Was Right, Coronavirus Cases ‘Will Go 
Down to Zero, Ultimately’, N.Y. MAG. INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 28, 2020), https://
perma.cc/R8YY-BGBE. 
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“corona flu” then implied that COVID-19 was less lethal than 
influenza.44 Unlike Kennedy, who digested intelligence reports 
on the Soviet threat in Cuba and took the matter seriously, 
Trump appears not to have trusted the intelligence and data on 
COVID-19, which delayed the federal response to the disease 
and foreclosed the possibility of containment.  
It is not just Trump’s distrust of data and delayed action on 
COVID-19 that contrasts with Kennedy’s response to Soviet 
missiles in Cuba. Kennedy actively engaged with data and 
respected the role of experts, even those who did not agree with 
him. He assembled an expert advisory group within hours of 
receiving intelligence assessments about the Soviet missiles in 
Cuba. He included the Joint Chiefs of Staff in that group, even 
though Kennedy distrusted them after the failed Bay of Pigs 
invasion. Trump and his administration, on the other hand, 
showed disdain for expertise. Only after COVID-19 had begun 
to spread in the United States did Trump begin to take the 
disease seriously and appoint a task force on COVID-19. The 
task force was comprised of preeminent infectious disease 
experts including Dr. Anthony Fauci, head of the National 
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases; Dr. Deborah Birx, 
who is a leading expert on HIV/AIDS and global health; Surgeon 
General Jerome Adams; and other administration officials; but 
Trump publicly contradicted his own experts’ assessments when 
they did not fit with his worldview. For example, at an April 21 
briefing, CDC Director Dr. Robert Redfield warned that a 
second wave of COVID-19 could be deadlier than the first wave, 
then Trump claimed the opposite: “[W]e will not go through 
what we went through for the last two months . . . It might not 
come back at all.”45 Dr. Fauci had to correct the president, 
saying, “We will have coronavirus in the fall. I am convinced of 
that because of the degree of transmissibility that it has, the 
global nature.”46 Perhaps most tellingly, Trump, who is not a 
doctor, began promoting the untested, off-label use of a 
prescription drug called hydroxychloroquine to treat COVID-19, 
 
 44. Aaron Rupar, “This Is Just My Hunch”: Trump Goes on Fox News and 
Spreads Misinformation About the Coronavirus, VOX (Mar. 5, 2020, 10:45 AM), 
https://perma.cc/3U8V-NNFV. 
 45. Cathey, supra note 36. 
 46. Id. 
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despite experts’ warnings that the drug could have dangerous 
complications and had not been shown to affect COVID-19.47  
Starting in March, while Trump was still downplaying the 
virus’s risk, states began issuing shelter-in-place orders, 
shutting down non-essential businesses, travel, and gatherings 
to slow the spread of COVID-19. On April 19, after the United 
States had been at a standstill for more than a month, Trump, 
in consultation with the task force and public health officials, 
released a strategy to safely reopen the country in phases as 
states meet certain criteria with regard to COVID-19 cases. The 
strategy’s first phase would allow for states to begin opening 
certain sectors, excluding schools and other areas where social 
distancing is difficult, provided that a state had seen a decline 
of documented COVID-19 cases over a two-week period or a 
decline in positive tests as a percent of total COVID-19 tests 
over a two-week period.48 A week later, Trump seemed to 
abandon his own reopening strategy and the advice of public 
health experts, telling governors to “start thinking about school 
openings.”49 By May, he had entirely abandoned his own 
strategy and was commending states for reopening even though 
 
 47. Jordan Culver & Rebecca Morin, ‘He’s Answered That Question.’ 
Trump Interrupts When Reporter Asks Fauci About Hydroxychloroquine, USA 
TODAY (Apr. 6, 2020, 11:23 AM), https://perma.cc/3USR-QFD6. On May 18, 
2020, Trump announced that he was taking hydroxychloroquine as a 
prophylactic, despite the Food and Drug Administration having warned 
against the use of hydroxychloroquine for COVID-19 treatment outside a 
hospital setting due to the drug increasing a person’s risk of heart problems. 
Trump suffers from heart disease. In October, he contracted COVID-19 and 
was hospitalized. Annie Karni & Katie Thomas, Trump Says He’s Taking 
Hydroxychloroquine, Prompting Warning from Health Experts, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/6C3C-BZ6E; Sanjay Gupta, President Trump 
Has Common Form of Heart Disease, CNN (Feb. 1, 2018, 3:03 PM), https://
perma.cc/W5C5-S26G; Kevin Liptak, Trump Taken to Walter Reed Medical 
Center and Will Be Hospitalized ‘For the Next Few Days’, CNN (Oct. 3, 2020, 
1:19 AM), https://perma.cc/FYB8-EVPV. 
 48. WHITE HOUSE & CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
GUIDELINES FOR OPENING UP AMERICA AGAIN (2020), https://perma.cc/P4H7-
KQG3 (PDF). 
 49. Katherine Faulders & Ben Gittleson, Trump Encourages Governors 
to ‘Seriously Consider’ Reopening Schools, ABC NEWS (Apr. 27, 2020, 3:25 PM), 
https://perma.cc/P6SF-JJVU. 
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they had not met the phase-one criteria,50 a move Dr. Fauci said 
may cause “suffering and death that could be avoided.”51 In the 
seven months following Dr. Fauci’s warning, COVID-19 cases 
spiked, killing more than 180,000 Americans.52 
V.  Immediate and Long-Term Effects of COVID-19 on 
National Security 
 COVID-19’s effects on U.S. national security evolved as 
the country sporadically emerged from months of social 
distancing and local shelter-in-place orders; however, it is clear 
that the pandemic harmed military readiness, laid bare to all 
that the United States is susceptible to biological threats, and 
helped cultivate violent extremism.  
A.  Immediate Effects on Military Readiness and Security 
The nature of military readiness requires large groups of 
service members to live, train, and work together in proximity. 
Starting in March 2020, the U.S. military reported that between 
100 and 200 service members each day were testing positive for 
COVID-19.53 By late May, the U.S. Department of Defense 
reported 6,168 cumulative cases of COVID-19 in the military, 
with more than 3,000 additional cases among military 
dependents, contractors, and civilian workers.54 The cumulative 
number of Department of Defense COVID-19 cases in early 
October exceeded 47,500 military service members, 10,000 
 
 50. Toluse Olorunnipa, Griff Witte & Lenny Bernstein, Trump Cheers on 
Governors Even as They Ignore White House Coronavirus Guidelines in Race 
to Reopen, WASH. POST (May 4, 2020, 9:10 PM), https://perma.cc/9RY8-UFGW. 
 51. John Wagner et al., Fauci Warns Senate That Reopening U.S. Too 
Quickly Could Lead to Avoidable ‘Suffering and Death’, WASH. POST (May 12, 
2020, 2:36 PM), https://perma.cc/NMK5-R5X7. 
 52. Compare COVID-19 United States Cases by County, JOHNS HOPKINS 
UNIV. (2020), https://perma.cc/7SC5-VLCT (totaling 259,900 deaths as of 
November 24, 2020), with US Historical Data, COVID TRACKING PROJECT, 
ATLANTIC, https://perma.cc/9HLH-WXR7 (last updated Dec. 21, 2020) (totaling 
79,040 deaths as of May 12, 2020). 
 53. Meghann Myers, The Military Continues to Diagnose More Than 100 
New COVID-19 Cases a Day, MIL. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2020), https://perma.cc
/T3BP-K53V. 
 54. Jennifer-Leigh Oprihory, Snapshot: DOD and COVID-19, AIR FORCE 
MAG. (May 27, 2020), https://perma.cc/Z7XH-CCLM. 
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civilian workers, 6,000 military dependents, and 4,000 
contractors, with nearly 100 deaths recorded.55  
On March 24, the USS Theodore Roosevelt (TR) reported 
that three service members had contracted COVID-19. The 
Department of Defense evacuated those service members but 
did not remove other sailors or sanitize the ship. The TR’s 
captain, Brett Crozier, sent a letter to his superiors and other 
Navy officials, complaining that the Navy was not adequately 
responding to the threat COVID-19 posed for sailors. Crozier 
wrote that the TR was unable to implement social-distancing 
guidelines recommended by the CDC and U.S. Navy, and urged 
evacuation of all service members except a small crew to 
maintain the ship’s reactor. In his letter, Crozier said, “Decisive 
action is required now in order to comply with CDC and [Navy] 
guidance and prevent tragic outcomes.”56 Following the letter, 
the Navy began evacuating sailors from the TR to quarantine in 
Guam, then relieved the captain of duty, ostensibly for 
exercising poor judgment.57 By April 3, the aircraft carrier had 
reported more than 100 positive cases.58 Nearly 1,200 sailors out 
of 4,865 onboard ultimately tested positive for COVID-19.59 
After two months of quarantine, the TR reentered service with 
precautions against COVID-19, including mandatory face 
masks, but thirteen sailors retested positive weeks later.60 The 
TR’s struggle to contain and mitigate COVID-19 is a microcosm 
 
 55. Jennifer-Leigh Oprihory, Snapshot: DOD and COVID-19, AIR FORCE 
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Deal With New COVID-19 Cases, ABC NEWS (May 23, 2020, 1:36 PM), https://
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 60. Sarah McCammon, 13 USS Roosevelt Sailors Test Positive for 
COVID-19, Again, NPR (May 16, 2020, 11:46 AM), https://perma.cc/4XBH-
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of how a communicable disease can damage military readiness 
on a larger scale.  
 COVID-19 did more than hamper immediate military 
readiness. Its disruptions may have long-lasting consequences 
for the nation’s armed forces. The pandemic forced the military 
to postpone exercises that are critical for ensuring U.S. service 
members and allied forces can quickly respond to military 
threats.61 Social-distancing measures, necessary for mitigating 
the spread of COVID-19, interrupted military recruitment, 
leading to a decrease in the number of people entering military 
training and creating a gap that is likely to cause the military 
to fall short of its end-strength goals.62 At the same time, 
according to General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, “There’s significant stress as a result of this COVID-19 
virus on the internal politics in other countries, on their 
economies, on resources. There is an increased probability or at 
least a risk of instability, significant instability, in some 
countries,”63 which heightens the need for U.S. military forces 
to be at peak operational performance in a post-COVID-19 
world. 
 Above COVID-19’s direct impact on military readiness, 
the pandemic showed the United States’ susceptibility to a 
targeted biological attack, which likely would involve 
pathogens, perhaps bioengineered, that could be deadlier and 
more easily transmittable than COVID-19; and failure of 
governments, even in high-income nations, to contain the virus 
 
 61. See Ryan Browne & Zachary Cohen, US Military Curtails Another 
Major Exercise Due to Coronavirus Pandemic, CNN (Mar. 16, 2020, 1:29 PM), 
https://perma.cc/R95J-ENX2 (covering the curtailment of U.S. military 
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likely made biological attacks more attractive to terrorists.64 At 
its height in the spring of 2020, COVID-19 overwhelmed 
hospitals in cities across the United States, which put lives at 
risk and made the nation susceptible to other threats as health 
care resources quickly dried up across the country. The Trump 
administration had allowed the National Strategic Stockpile to 
become so woefully depleted that the federal government 
initially distributed only 11.7 million N-95 respirators, which 
accounted for 90 percent of the nation’s reserves—even though 
the Trump administration estimated the United States would 
need 3.5 billion masks.65 Facing a critical shortage of ventilators 
needed to help patients with severe COVID-19 symptoms 
breathe, hospitals were forced to modify ventilators to serve 
more than one patient and consider do-not-resuscitate orders for 
some patients in order to ensure those most likely to recover had 
access to the life-saving devices.66 And COVID-19 hotspots 
quickly ran short on health care professionals, which required 
tens of thousands of doctors and nurses from areas with low 
rates of COVID-19, even those trained in fields unrelated to the 
 
 64. See ANDREW SILKE, POOL RE SOLS., COVID-19 AND TERRORISM: 
ASSESSING THE SHORT- AND LONG-TERM IMPACTS 7 (2020), https://perma.cc
/3K4X-87QW (PDF) (“One genuine concern is that COVID-19 may lead to a 
resurgence in interest among terrorists for using [Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, and Nuclear] weapons.”); Gary Ackerman & Hayley Peterson, 
Terrorism and COVID-19: Actual and Potential Impacts, 14 PERSPS. ON 
TERRORISM 59, 64 (2020), https://perma.cc/35QW-5EP2 
The inability of even highly developed countries to stop the spread 
of the virus and the often incoherent and delayed responses of 
authorities at all levels have exposed the myriad weaknesses 
present in global public health systems. Such outcomes will not go 
unnoticed by terrorist groups, who will remember these impacts 
when seeking new means to achieve their goals. It must be 
remembered that a key strategy of terrorism is to inflict 
psychological damage on populations as a means of 
coercion . . . . The societal disruption, economic damage, and deaths 
caused by COVID-19 are a perfect script for the theatre of 
terrorism. 
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https://perma.cc/7PNB-M3HD. 
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disease, to voluntarily travel to alleviate the shortage of medical 
staff in hard-hit areas.67  
By March 31, the outbreak’s epicenter had shifted from the 
West Coast to New York City, where COVID-19 cases numbered 
38,000. Hospitals, overwhelmed with COVID-19 patients and 
resultant deaths, set up makeshift morgues in refrigerated 
trucks. Hospitals ran out of personal protective equipment, such 
as N-95 respirators and gowns, and ventilators. Health care 
professionals were left to improvise, wearing homemade cloth 
masks, using trash bags as gowns, and modifying ventilators to 
serve two patients at a time.68 Within a few months of 
COVID-19 entering the United States, thousands of health care 
workers had contracted the disease, and hundreds of them 
died.69 COVID-19 overwhelmed the country’s health care 
system, resulting in deaths that might have been prevented had 
the executive branch followed its own national security and 
biodefense strategies, but the effects of a health care system 
stretched beyond its capacity did not end there. More than 
259,000 lives in the United States were lost to COVID-19 in just 
eight months,70 demonstrating to bad actors that a biological 
event could efficiently cause deaths on a scale greater than the 
detonation of a 150 kiloton W-80 thermonuclear warhead in San 
Francisco.71 
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B.  Long-Term Effects on Race-Based and Anti-Government 
Violence 
The long-term effects of COVID-19 on national security will 
not be known until long after the pandemic has ended, but the 
disease itself and the Trump administration’s bungled response 
have made the United States more susceptible to violent 
extremism. 
As COVID-19 spread across the globe, governments sought 
to contain the deadly virus by restricting public gatherings and 
social interaction. Many countries, including the United States, 
shut down all but the most essential businesses and limited 
public interactions.72 Much of the retail, food, and drink 
industries in the United States, which employ 26 million people, 
shuttered almost overnight.73 Schools closed. Courts went 
online. COVID-19 disrupted people’s lives and destroyed their 
livelihoods. As discussed in Part IV.B. above, President Donald 
J. Trump refused to implement a national strategy for 
combatting the pandemic, leaving mayors and governors to 
apply a patchwork of public health policies, including business 
closures and stay-at-home orders, in their own jurisdictions. 
And the president sowed distrust in government by attacking 
public health experts, media, and other elected officials who 
criticized his inaction. Public confusion about COVID-19, their 
fear of an unknown disease, social isolation, and economic 
turmoil fueled anxiety and depression in the United States, 
which has increased as shutdowns continued74—conditions that 
“arguably make a greater number of people more susceptible to 
radicalizing narratives that seek to scapegoat various ‘others’ 
and promise simple solutions.”75  
 
 72. Daniel Dunford et al., Coronavirus: The World in Lockdown in Maps 
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Social media has been the tool for extremists to prey on 
people and promote violence.76 American University Professor 
Cynthia Miller-Idriss described COVID-19 and the necessary 
public health shutdown measures as having presented a 
“perfect storm for extremist recruitment” because of the “vast 
and evolving ecosystem of toxic online spaces, combined with 
potentially unprecedented amounts of time online and 
increasing anxiety and isolation for some,” especially young 
people.77 According to the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 
“COVID-19 has been seized by far-right groups as an 
opportunity to call for extreme violence. This includes 
mobilisation by white supremacist communities as well as the 
increased prevalence of memes which semi-ironically promote 
insurrectional violence across a range of social media 
platforms.”78 By disrupting people’s routines and fostering 
anxiety on a mass scale, COVID-19 increased the likelihood that 
extremist propaganda would find an audience. Security experts 
at the State University of New York at Albany have reported 
“widespread attempts by various extremists, including 
terrorists, to prey on the uncertainties, anxieties, and 
disruptions caused by the pandemic—as well as a newly captive 
online audience—in order to feed into and, they hope, broaden 
the appeal of their narratives.”79  
One white supremacist social media channel grew its user 
base by 800 percent in March of 2020.80 During the first week of 
COVID-19 shutdowns across the United States, white 
supremacist content on Google saw a 13 percent increase in 
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engagement.81 Reports of anti-Asian hatred, harassment, and 
violence rose throughout the United States.82 A study by the 
Asian Pacific Policy and Planning Council and Chinese for 
Affirmative Action found more than 2,000 anti-Asian incidents 
in the first three months of COVID-19 alone.83 An Asian woman 
in California was spit on by a man who also yelled for a bus to 
run her over.84 In Wisconsin, police arrested a man who 
allegedly harassed Asian customers for wearing protective 
masks while shopping.85 And a study of Twitter hashtags 
between February and April of 2020 found a 300 percent 
increase in tweets encouraging or inciting violence against 
China or Chinese people.86 Forty-three percent of those tweets 
originated in the United States.87 
COVID-19 also breathed new life into anti-government 
conspiracies and anti-government violence. The U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security warned that 
“anti-government and anti-authority violent extremists could be 
motivated to conduct attacks in response to perceived 
infringement of liberties and government overreach as all levels 
of government seek to limit the spread of the coronavirus that 
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has caused a worldwide pandemic.”88 The “boogaloo” ideology is 
a prescient example. Boogaloo is an evolving far-right 
movement whose followers believe a coming civil war is 
necessary to overthrow what they believe is a tyrannical U.S. 
government.89 The movement gained traction on social media 
following government implementation of COVID-19 public 
health restrictions.90 A central narrative of the boogaloo 
movement has been “[t]he function of COVID-19 as a tool, used 
by the U.S. government and law enforcement, to further infringe 
public freedoms under the guise of emergency response.”91 With 
people stuck at home during COVID-19, the boogaloo movement 
found a captive audience and shifted focus from extreme gun 
rights to COVID-19 restrictions as examples of government 
tyranny.92 One boogaloo follower allegedly shot two security 
officers during a protest against police violence at a California 
courthouse, killing one of the officers. According to law 
enforcement, a week later, the boogaloo follower ambushed 
police who were executing a search warrant at his home, killing 
one police officer and injuring another.93  
Then, in October, federal and state police in Michigan 
arrested thirteen men for plotting to storm the Michigan state 
capitol and kidnap Governor Gretchen Whitmer.94 Seven of the 
men appeared to be boogaloo adherents who organized into a 
militia called the “Wolverine Watchmen” under the leadership 
of a person whose online persona was “Boogaloo Bunyan.” Law 
enforcement alleged that the  
Wolverine Watchmen ha[d] called on members to identify 
law enforcement officers[’] home addresses in order to target 
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the officers, ha[d] made threats of violence to instigate a civil 
war leading to societal collapse, and ha[d] engaged in 
planning and training for an operation to attack the Capitol 
of Michigan, and kidnap Government officials including the 
Governor of Michigan.95 
In a short period of time, boogaloo followers and 
anti-government extremists had moved from the internet to the 
real world, with violent consequences. 
Although the QAnon conspiracy predates COVID-19, the 
pandemic supercharged the conspiracy theory and its violent 
effects. Tweets about the QAnon conspiracy theory, which 
“purports that America is run by a cabal of pedophiles and 
Satan-worshippers who run a global child sex-trafficking 
operation and that President Trump is the only person who can 
stop them,”96 nearly doubled after COVID-19 entered the United 
States.97 By March, COVID-19 was spreading through the 
country’s third largest city, Los Angeles. To relieve the burden 
on local hospitals, the U.S. Navy sent USNS Mercy to the Port 
of Los Angeles to treat non-COVID-19 patients who otherwise 
would have been admitted to local hospitals.98 The Mercy began 
accepting patients on March 30. Then, on March 31, a 
forty-four-year-old train engineer allegedly derailed a train 
delivering supplies to the Mercy.99 According to law 
enforcement, the train engineer was “suspicious of the 
U.S.N.S. [Mercy] and believe[d] it had an alternate purpose 
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related to . . . COVID-19 or a government takeover.”100 
Although it remains unclear if the engineer followed QAnon 
conspiracy theories, his beliefs, statements, and actions align 
with QAnon. For example, QAnon believers had “celebrat[ed] 
the [U.S.] Navy’s deployment of hospital ships as a sign that the 
Trump administration [wa]s clawing America back from the 
grip of Satanic pedophile elites,”101 and the engineer told police, 
“People don’t know what’s going on here. Now they will. At 
night, they turn off the lights and don’t let anyone in. I’m going 
to expose this to the world.”102 Moreover, a central theme of 
QAnon conspiracies is “the promise of a Great Awakening, in 
which the elites will be routed and the truth will be 
revealed.”103 The anonymous social media user behind 
QAnon, known only as Q, posted about the “Great 
Awakening” only three days before the engineer’s attempted 
attack on the Mercy.104 Following his arrest, the engineer told 
the FBI that he derailed the train “out of the desire to ‘wake 
people up.’”105 The engineer also claimed that “the whole world 
is watching” his actions, parroting a March 28 Q post that began 
by saying “the entire world is watching.”106  
In late April, a thirty-seven-year-old woman in Illinois 
loaded her car with eighteen knives and drove for two days, 
allegedly trying reach the U.S. Navy’s USNS Comfort, which 
was docked in New York City to assist with COVID-19 relief. 
The woman had become radicalized by QAnon conspiracy 
theories on social media.107 During her drive to New York City, 
 
 100. Criminal Complaint at 6–7, United States v. Moreno, No. 
20-mj-01480 (C.D. Ca. Apr. 1, 2020), ECF No. 1, https://perma.cc/EH32-TKWQ 
(PDF).  
 101. Brendan Thomas-Noone & James Holloway, Conspiracy in the Time 
of Coronavirus, U.S. STUD. CTR. (Apr. 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/TZH5-6ZXY. 
 102. Criminal Complaint, supra note 100, at 5. 
 103. Adrienne LaFrance, The Prophecies of Q, ATLANTIC (May 14, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/H9HV-S6V9. 
 104. Amarnath Amarasingam & Marc-André Argentino, The QAnon 
Conspiracy Theory: A Security Threat in the Making?, CTC SENTINEL 37, 40 
(2020), https://perma.cc/W8MY-RUZF (PDF). 
 105. Press Release, U.S. Att’y, C.D. Ca., Train Operator at Port of Los 
Angeles Charged with Derailing Locomotive Near U.S. Navy’s Hospital Ship 
Mercy (Apr. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/N2BY-NB74. 
 106. Amarasingam & Argentino, supra note 104, at 40. 
 107. Id. at 40–41. 
244 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 217 (2021) 
 
the woman threatened to murder former Vice President Joe 
Biden, who she believed was part of a non-existent cabal of 
Democrats engaged in pedophilia—one of many baseless QAnon 
conspiracies.108 The woman arrived at the USS Intrepid, 
apparently mistaking it for the Comfort, and was arrested. 
According to reports following her arrest, the woman’s Facebook 
page was “filled with references to QAnon,” and she had fumed 
about Frazzledrip, a non-existent video that “QAnon believers 
claim features [former Secretary of State Hillary] Clinton and 
former Clinton aide Huma Abedin murdering a child.”109 The 
woman variously believed a QAnon conspiracy theory that the 
USNS Comfort was being used by the Trump administration to 
rescue abused children from the non-existent pedophilia cabal 
and her own theory that the Comfort was being used by the 
non-existent cabal to hold children hostage.110 According to 
researchers at the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 
only twenty days passed between the woman’s first contact with 
the QAnon conspiracy and her commitment to engage in 
violence: “It is highly likely that QAnon conspiracy theories 
radicalized her to an apparent desire to commit violence, in light 
of [past] trauma that made her vulnerable.”111 
In essence, COVID-19 has been a boon for violent 
extremists, white supremacists, and conspiracy theorists, who 
have used COVID-19 as a rallying call for followers. White 
supremacists had a non-white “other” to blame for the 
pandemic—China and people of Chinese descent. Their racism 
was bolstered by President Trump, who alternated between 
calling COVID-19 the “Chinese virus” and “kung flu.”112 
Anti-government extremists simultaneously pointed to the 
government’s inability to mitigate COVID-19 and restrictions 
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on public interactions as evidence for their cause. The Trump 
administration’s refusal to implement a national strategy for 
combatting the virus and attacks on COVID-19 restrictions in 
Democrat-led jurisdictions nurtured anti-government 
extremists’ belief that a civil war is necessary to protect liberty. 
Conspiracy theories found a population of people isolated at 
home, seeking a sense of community, and hungry for 
information to bring order to the sudden disarray caused by 
COVID-19. And extremist ideology egged on by national leaders 
opened social fissures in the United States, which have been 
exploited by foreign adversaries to sow fear and hatred among 
Americans, undermine the U.S. government, weaken the 
United States’ credibility abroad, and influence U.S. 
elections.113 
VI.  Looking Forward 
As threats continue to evolve, the United States 
government must reevaluate its national security preparedness 
strategies to ensure biological and non-military threats are 
treated with the same urgency as military and intelligence 
threats, regardless of who leads the executive branch.  
Protecting national security from biological threats begins 
by rebuilding U.S. diplomatic relations. Changes in population, 
urbanization, and climate have increased the likelihood that 
zoonotic diseases will emerge, particularly in regions where 
those changes are most acute.114 As the spread of COVID-19 has 
demonstrated, naturally occurring biological threats do not 
respect national boundaries. The world is increasingly 
interconnected, and the United States should take the lead in 
biopreparedness and bioresponse. That means retracting the 
Trump administration’s intent to withdraw from the World 
Health Organization, developing partnerships between U.S. 
researchers and their international counterparts, and 
rebuilding global alliances centered on transparency and 
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cooperation. Better diplomacy means that when the next 
infectious disease emerges, the United States will be prepared 
to work with nations around the world to contain, mitigate, or 
eradicate the threat. 
Moreover, the federal government should reevaluate the 
National Security Council’s role in pandemic surveillance and 
response planning. Health experts should have a dedicated role 
in setting and carrying out national security policy with regard 
to biothreats. One option would be to reestablish NSC’s 
Directorate of Global Health Security and Biodefense, 
commonly referred to as the pandemic response team, which 
was created by the Obama administration and disbanded under 
the Trump administration.115 Alternatively, a president could 
appoint a National Security Council staff member to serve as a 
pandemic coordinator, whose job would be to monitor federal 
agencies’ assessments of biological threats, report emerging 
biological threats to the National Security Council, and 
coordinate agencies’ plans in the event a disease becomes an 
epidemic or pandemic.  
Protecting the nation and its people is a core government 
function, but national security is achievable only if the federal 
government develops coordinated, comprehensive plans and has 
decision makers who are capable of executing those plans. 
President Kennedy largely got it right during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. He gathered relevant data, assembled expert advisers, 
listened to his advisers and to Congress, settled on a strategy, 
and followed through with it. President Trump largely got it 
wrong during the COVID-19 pandemic. He ignored data and 
intelligence, assembled then contradicted expert advisers, 
sidestepped Congress, eschewed an already existing strategy, 
and lied to the public about the public health threat. The 
result—no national strategy for mitigating the effects of a 
pandemic, a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction patchwork of public 
health policies that struggled to contain the virus, and mass 
anxiety that made people more susceptible to violent 
ideology — compounded COVID-19’s danger to U.S. national 
security. These proposals, whether enacted through legislation 
or policy making, are in no way a panacea, but they will serve 
as guardrails to ensure the federal government is prepared to 
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follow its own national security and biodefense strategies in the 
event of another deadly pandemic. 
